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Epistocracy for Online Deliberative Bioethics 
 
 
GIUSEPPE SCHIAVONE, MATTEO MAMELI, and GIOVANNI BONIOLO 
 
Abstract: The suggestion that deliberative democratic approaches would suit the 
management of bioethical policymaking in democratic pluralistic societies has 
triggered what has been called the “deliberative turn” in health policy and bioethics. 
Most of the empirical work in this area has focused on the allocation of healthcare 
resources and priority setting at the local or national level. The variety of the more or 
less articulated theoretical efforts behind such initiatives is remarkable and has been 
accompanied, to date, by an overall lack of method specificity. We propose a set of 
methodological requirements for online deliberative procedures for bioethics. We 
provide a theoretical motivation for these requirements. In particular, we discuss and 
adapt an “epistocratic” proposal and argue that, regardless of its merits as a general 
political theory, a more refined version of its normative claims can generate a useful 
framework for the design of bioethical forums that combine maximal inclusiveness 
with informed and reasonable deliberation. 
 




The so-called deliberative turn in health policy and bioethics has been characterized 
as lacking in method specificity.[1] Disputes regarding institutional design for 
bioethical forums essentially concern competing political theories for the handling of 
moral disagreement. It is sensible, therefore, to take a genuinely politico-
philosophical stance as to what the institutions that deal with moral disagreement 
ought to look like. In fact, any attempt at designing a public forum for the discussion 
of health policies and bioethical issues can be said to embed the features of the 
political theory its proponents endorse. It is therefore essential, for both practical and 
theoretical reasons, to lay out in detail the methodological requirements for carrying 
out deliberative attempts, and to be explicit about the normative claims that lie behind 
these requirements. 
 
In this contribution, starting from an analysis of a recent defense of epistocracy—that 
is, the form of government in which the rulers are those who know the most[2]—and 
of its shortcomings, we argue that, although problematic as a general political theory, 
if restricted in scope to specific ethical issues arising in the domain of the life 
sciences, some epistocratic constraints might be useful. Taking into account specific 
methodological considerations,[3] we show how soft epistocratic constraints can be 
reconciled with deliberative participatory democracy in the case of policymaking in 
bioethics. We do this by advancing some suggestions on how to design participatory 
online forums for public decisions on bioethical issues.[4] 
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Brennan’s Epistocracy 
 
Jason Brennan has recently argued in favor of an alleged right to a competent 
electorate.[5] His point, at least apparently, is not that incompetent voters will simply 
harm other people and hence ought to be disenfranchised. Rather, just like juries, 
electorates lack authority and legitimacy whenever they decide incompetently or on 
the basis of morally unreasonable claims and not necessarily because their decisions 
are incorrect or harmful. Incompetent voting is unjust in that citizens have a basic 
right not to be deprived “of life, liberty or property ... as a result of decisions made by 
an incompetent or morally unreasonable deliberative body.” Brennan calls this the 
competence principle.[6] He suggests screening out incompetent voters using written 
voter exams. 
 
Brennan defends his claims from two main objections put forth by Estlund against 
previous versions of epistocracy.[7] He argues that the first objection does not apply to 
his form of epistocracy, whereas the second one is not decisive. Estlund’s first 
objection attacks the authority tenet, which justifies giving more power over others to 
those who know more. The authority tenet should be rejected—so the objection 
goes—in that it commits the expert/boss fallacy, which amounts to unduly assuming 
that being an expert is sufficient grounds for someone to hold power over others. 
However, Brennan argues that his case for epistocracy relies not on the authority tenet 
but, rather, on a negative version of it, which he calls the antiauthority tenet. This 
asserts that moral unreasonableness and ignorance are sufficient reasons to justify not 
granting someone political authority over others. 
 
Yet, Brennan admits, his argument is vulnerable to a second kind of (he claims non-
decisive) objection. Epistocratically restricted suffrage can be said to violate what 
Estlund calls the qualified acceptability requirement. Widely shared in liberal 
political philosophy, the principle states that “no one has authority or legitimate 
coercive power over another without a justification that could be accepted by all 
qualified points of view.”[8] The procedure that embodies the debatable justification 
for distributing political power is, in Brennan’s case, the written test that he suggests 
ought to be used in order to prevent morally unreasonable and ignorant people from 
participating. A polity could agree that there is a difference between competent and 
incompetent people; nonetheless, it might not be possible to find an agreement among 
reasonable people as to the proper means to track the distinction between competence 
and incompetence. Hence, epistocracy is unjust insofar as the test for competence is 
qualifiedly objectionable. However, given that a choice must be made, Brennan 
argues, one cannot but opt for the lesser injustice between (1) the enforcement of 
policies picked by an incompetent deliberative body and (2) the enforcement of a 
specific way, not universally accepted, to track the distinction between competence 
and incompetence. He argues for the second option in two ways: 
 
1. Democracy with universal suffrage violates the competence principle. 
Epistocracy violates the qualified acceptability requirement. The former 
violation is inherently worse than the latter, as shown by the fact that we 
promptly accept voting age laws, which already are a form of weak 
epistocracy. We ought to accept, then, other—namely, better—forms of 
epistocracy. 
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2. Epistocratic policies are likely to be “better able to achieve prosperity and 
various humanitarian goals.”[9] 
 
Regarding the first point, we notice that Brennan fails to effectively support the claim 
that his epistocratic proposal is morally preferable to democracy with voting age laws. 
Even if it is conceded that the justification for this institution is epistocratic, one can 
argue that the institution is better able to satisfy the qualified acceptability 
requirement and is thus less morally troublesome than Brennan’s voting licenses. This 
is the case because every voter, at some point in his or her life, has been underage, 
thereby making this threshold for political participation more likely to be acceptable 
to every qualified point of view. After all, “age groups do not age, but birth cohorts 
do.”[10] Recognizing a threshold that makes reference to age groups—as voting age 
laws do—is thus a measure that does not favor any distinct group of people and 
should therefore be seen as prima facie acceptable. With Brennan’s epistocratic test, 
there is a possibility that some individuals will never be able to pass voter exams. 
 
Regarding the second point, we notice that its truth depends on empirical evidence, 
and currently no evidence supports the claim that epistocratic institutions produce 
better policies. A rich literature is developing concerning the output that more 
inclusive institutions tend to have on the governance of local and regional 
administrations.[11,12,13] We are not aware of even small-scale experiments that try and 
build a case for epistocratic institutions. Moreover, grounding the assessment of 
epistocracy in the goodness of the policies it would yield seems to deliberately 
overlook the distinction between the instrumental and the procedural value of political 
institutions.[14] Such a distinction is crucial for Brennan’s own uncoupling of the 
legitimacy and the correctness of decisions. 
 
Despite these considerations, the idea that only those who are not ignorant and 
unreasonable can legitimately participate in certain kinds of policymaking is a 
plausible one. In particular, it is plausible in the context of policymaking on bioethical 
issues, in which the ignorance and the unreasonableness of those who participate in 
the decision-making can certainly result in illegitimate and otherwise undesirable 
outcomes. Whereas the main goal of political participation within representative 
democracies à la Schumpeter[15] can be roughly reduced to the mere selection of a 
leader (and his or her underlying political platform) under conditions of free 
competition, republican democratic governance seems to entail a multifaceted array of 
modes of participation that extend well beyond the selection of some ruling leader or 
elite. Brennan’s tests seem to act as constraints on the former kind of participation, 
whereas the kind of constraints we envisage are instead conceived of as applying to 
issue-specific participatory forums that clearly appeal to the latter (republican) 
democratic framework and should be seen as an attempt at broadening the scope of 
participation in democracy. Constraints on the first sort of participation look 
unpromising for at least one set of reasons: the selection of a leader depends in a very 
indirect way on the identification of his or her political platform. The relation that 
links a candidate’s political platform to the actual implementation, once elected, of 
policies based on that platform is in turn even more tortuous. In this context it is hard 
to think of sensible criteria to pin down what constitutes the relevant knowledge to be 
possessed in order to cast a reasonable and competent vote. On the one hand, this 
means that voters exercise (whether competently or not) very indirectly a fairly little 
amount of power over others, and therefore the demand that they do so competently 
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seems to put the burden of proof on those who claim that this power will result in 
some harm to others. On the other hand, deciding whether one does exercise his or her 
negligible power competently (whether in harmful ways or not) is indeed very likely 
to lead to controversy. In contrast, direct participation in issue-specific deliberative 
forums can, when such forums are endowed with recommending powers, exercise 
precisely the kind of authority over others that demands that the competence principle 
be held in due consideration.[16] 
 
Thus, in the context of designing procedures for bioethical policymaking that are as 
democratic, participatory, and inclusive as possible, considering the introduction of 
epistocratic constraints seems useful, though much depends, as we will see in the 




The Shortcomings of Voter Exams 
 
Brennan claims that “a written voter exam is not the only way to attempt to enforce 
the competence principle. I can think of other ways, but most of them are either 
prohibitively costly or unrealistic.”[17] He proposes written general exams aimed at 
testing for politico-economic knowledge and moral reasonableness. These would be 
tests that citizens need to pass only once, in order to be granted a lifelong voting 
license. 
 
There are various problems with this proposal. One issue concerns whether only 
politico-economic knowledge would be an essential part of a responsible citizen’s 
knowledge. It is unclear, for instance, why some basic understanding of science ought 
not to be a condition for the responsible exercise of political rights, especially in 
societies in which science and technology play an important role. Another issue 
concerns the requirement that people be morally reasonable, which, given how 
controversial the notion of moral reasonableness is, seems too difficult to test in any 
sensible way. A further issue concerns the lifelong nature of the licenses granted 
according to Brennan’s proposal. Both political economy and morality are progressive 
endeavors frequently undergoing changes within the span of an individual’s lifetime. 
The belief that racial segregation is legitimate would probably not feature as a trait 
associated with moral unreasonableness in the 1920s in the Southern states of the 
United States, whereas it clearly would now.[18] The only way to remedy this would 
be to have periodic exams. But this would make the procedure much more costly and 
organizationally cumbersome.  
 
Given these theoretical and practical shortcomings, which are central to the very 
legitimacy and workability of epistocracy, we propose instead ways of testing the 
competence relevant with specific and particular deliberative issues rather than with 
the competence that, according to Brennan, is required for the general exercise of 
one’s voting rights. 
 
 
Online Epistocratic Participation for Deliberative Bioethics 
 
In policymaking regarding bioethical issues, epistocratic constraints on participation 
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seem morally desirable. Though in this contribution we are focusing specifically on 
bioethical issues, the same seems to apply to policymaking for the governance of 
most techno-scientifically complex issues. These are areas in which it is hard to see 
how decisions could be legitimate when made by deliberators who do not know 
enough about the matters deliberated on. On the one hand, non-experts do not have 
the relevant kind of knowledge to produce legitimate decisions. On the other hand, it 
would be wrong to leave the decisions about bioethical and more generally techno-
scientific issues to the experts, partly because the experts might be unreliable—for a 
variety of reasons—at tracking the interests of the non-experts and partly because the 
non-experts have a non-instrumental interest in participating directly in decisions 
about bioethical and techno-scientific issues that affect them. Paradoxically perhaps, 
soft epistocratic constraints like those suggested subsequently might be a way of 
making participation in the decision-making as inclusive as possible while at the same 
time ensuring that the outcomes of the deliberation are legitimate. 
 
One specific reason why Brennan’s proposal is highly problematic is that his test 
affects political rights across the board. Tests that apply to specific moments of 
political participation are likely to be less problematic, in that they do not involve a 
generic disenfranchisement of incompetent voters but rather deploy the reasonable 
requirement that the legitimacy of recommending decisions that concern extremely 
complex scientific issues ought to depend on whether the decision is made as 
inclusively and as competently as possible. Issue-specific restrictions to participation 
in online deliberative forums designed to deal with bioethical issues might provide a 
good example of how good epistocratic solutions can be reconciled with inclusiveness 
and provision of opportunities for participation.  
 
A number of contemporary political philosophers have articulated a wide range of 
deliberative approaches to democracy.[19, 20, 21, 22, 23] Despite the differences, all these 
approaches share a broad conception of deliberative democracy that relies on two 
main kernels: (1) the  democratic kernel , according to which decisions affecting 
people’s lives ought to be made, in general and when possible, by those affected 
people themselves, and (2) the  deliberative kernel, according to which collective 
decision-making ought to be the result of argument and the use of public reason by 
free and equal citizens.[24] 
 
Public bioethics essentially concerns the pursuit of collectively binding decisions that 
are legitimate in the face of moral disagreement. Thus, if politics is the means by 
which people’s views inform the way they are governed, then public bioethics is a 
political endeavor throughout.[25] Institutions meant to deal with bioethics can 
therefore be designed according to different political theories. Gutmann and 
Thompson suggest that the political theory that would best suit bioethical debates 
might be one that asks “citizens and officials to justify any demands for collective 
action by giving reasons that can be accepted by those who are bound by the 
action.”[26] Such is a deliberative approach to bioethics. It has four main purposes: (1) 
to promote the legitimacy of collective decisions; (2) to encourage public-spiritedness 
in public decision-making; (3) to foster an economy of moral disagreement, 
encouraging the use of moral rationales for collectively binding decisions that would 
minimize the rejection of opposing positions; and (4) to help correct mistakes due to 
partial understanding. 
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The enforcement of laws or policies touching on morally sensitive spots demands 
both that people who are constrained by those laws have a say in their making and, 
importantly, that people who participate by presenting their arguments do so 
competently precisely in order for the resulting decision to be qualifiedly acceptable. 
This suggests that, within the domain of bioethics, the competence principle ought to 
have some priority over the qualified acceptability requirement. Such a priority, 
restricted in scope to the political management of bioethical issues, does not share the 
problematic aspect of Brennan’s suggestion: in fact, subjecting participation in 
bioethical public forums to epistocratic constraints, in contrast with Brennan’s 
proposal, entails no disenfranchisement of rights to political participation.[27] Citizens 
retain their political status regardless of their competence in, say, stem cell research, 
and they will therefore retain their right to contest the very legitimacy of the 
competence test deployed. Furthermore, citizens’ ability to contribute competently to 
public forums for bioethics, given their proper motivation, is encouraged by the kind 
of pedagogical setting outlined subsequently. 
 
It is worth noting here that, even though we list a series of procedural constraints on 
the contributions that citizens might make to policymaking in bioethics, the main 
purpose of our methodological proposal is that of increasing the inclusiveness of 
deliberation in bioethics rather than that of generating barriers to participation. Ours is 
an attempt to provide citizens with the proper means for considered judgment and 
thereby with the means for legitimate active participation.[28] This implies that the 
epistocratic tools ought to be used cum grano salis, namely, by complementing their 
availability with proper efforts to contain the risk of exclusion of those sections of the 
population that do not master (for reasons that might be morally neutral) the science 
and the ethics relevant for proper deliberation about specifi c bioethical issues. This 
can be done, for instance, by keeping the forum open but selectively recruiting,[29] that 
is, encouraging the outreach of public forums targeting those populational subsets 
whose low civic engagement decreases the legitimacy of morally controversial, 
collectively binding decisions. 
 
A number of attempts at deliberative bioethics prompted by such theoretical 
considerations have already been made. Essentially, bioethical forums can lie along a 
continuum that goes from blunt technocracy to grassroots participation. At the former 
end of the continuum, power is granted directly to experts, picked through more or 
less public and more or less reasonable procedures. At the latter end, institutions are 
meant to be as inclusive and as open as possible. Democratic deliberative efforts such 
as the initiatives promoted by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFEA; instituted in 1990 with the purpose of overseeing and regulating the use of 
gametes and embryos in research and clinical/medical practice) try to be as inclusive 
as possible without sacrificing the considered argumentative nature proper of 
deliberation. In order to strike this balance, articulate public consultations that resort 
to methods ranging from standard opinion polls to public conferences to deliberative 
workshops are organized.[30] 
 
These kinds of workshops usually host no more than 100 people and go on over a 
long period of time, hence demanding a series of encounters meant to lay out the facts 
and outline and openly discuss the arguments. Considered judgment requires, indeed, 
time and a definite effort of moderation and encouragement on the part of the hosting 
institution. If scaled up to the entire population, face-to-face deliberative workshops 
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are very unlikely to be an efficient way of implementing epistocratic constraints on 
political participation. Online participatory and deliberative tools provide an 
alternative worth exploring. Hosting the deliberation online might allow for a number 
of advantages, for example, cost containment, longer availability of the forum, 
ubiquitous accessibility, and so on. Indeed, parts of the consultations led by the 
HFEA, for instance, were hosted online. This solution was, however, implemented 
without any mechanism confirming that participants had actually gone through the 
information material or that they were familiar with the relevant issues. Moreover, the 
online participatory process did not allow participants to present their own reasons 
and arguments and to discuss the reasons and arguments of others, which is crucial for 
the deliberative kernel. 
 
The alternative online participatory process we propose is structured as follows: 
 
1. In a preliminary phase, citizens are asked to set the agenda of the 
deliberative process, selecting issues they feel demand public deliberation. 
These issues are then translated into specific yes/no questions whose 
formulation is tested for impartiality and perspicuity by participants in a given 
span of time prior to the deliberation. 
 
2. Following insights drawn from experiences falling within James Fishkin’s 
deliberative polling scholarship,[31] the participants to the deliberative process 
are asked to provide their intuitive and unreasoned answer to the deliberative 
question in order for the transformative potential of deliberation to be gauged 
quantitatively. Somewhat differently from Fishkin’s approach, though, we 
propose to complement the measurement of the shift in preferences with a 
genuinely deliberative effort that does not rely merely on the aggregation of 
individual preferences subsequent to the information and discussion phases 
described subsequently. 
 
3. The participants are individually exposed to the relevant scientific 
information. Again, differently from deliberative efforts that rely on 
information provision, this participatory process provides information via a 
two-way instrument. This allows for the contestation and reformulation of 
specific portions of the information provided (in a fashion similar to that of 
Wikipedia entries). Participants are tested on their knowledge of basic 
(theoretically uncontroversial) facts contained in (or implied by) the 
information materials. Those who fail the test are not allowed to proceed to 
the next phase. These participants receive feedback, and they can restart this 
phase of the deliberative process if they wish. 
 
4. The participants are individually exposed to the known repertoire of 
relevant moral arguments concerning the deliberative issue in question. They 
are then required to object to a selection of arguments supporting their answer 
to the deliberative questions and to provide some arguments in defense of their 
view. This is meant to foster the understanding of people with different 
perspectives, hence discouraging and counteracting the ideological opposition 
that sometimes characterizes this kind of confrontation. The arguments and 
counterarguments produced by participants are tested for logical consistency 
and rhetorical correctness. Those participants who provide very poor 
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arguments (meaning arguments that are either logically inconsistent or rely on 
premises whose terms are not acceptable, at least in principle, to those who are 
committed to finding fair terms of cooperation) in defense of their view or 
against views they dislike are not allowed to proceed to the next phase. These 
participants receive feedback and can restart this phase of the deliberative 
process if they wish. 
 
5. The participants are given access to an online asynchronous open forum in 
which they discuss their respective positions with one another. The process of 
discussion results in the draft of a deliberative document akin to the ones that 
bioethical committees generally produce. In case consensus among 
participants is not forthcoming, “dissenting opinions” can be noted and 
underwritten by participants. 
 
The structure of the participatory process described is meant to embed the 
competence principle in the technological support, thus screening out ignorant and 
unreasonable participants. But the process is also maximally inclusive, partly because 
it allows participants to acquire the relevant competence and partly because it allows 
the participants to reenter the process in case they are unable to satisfy the 
requirements for proper participation at one point or another. The epistocratic 
constraints are soft constraints on participation. The aim is to combine two values 
singled out as central by influential theorists of democratic innovations[32,33]—namely, 
considered judgment and inclusion. Proposals of this kind have a series of advantages 
over Brennan’s tests and face-to-face deliberative workshops. As compared to 
Brennan’s exams, (1) they provide properly motivated citizens with the actual chance 
to be competent and reasonable enough to participate in the deliberative process, 
giving them the means for a non-dominated and non-dominating choice;[34] (2) 
because the process is issue specific, a quiz testing for a subset of basic knowledge 
considered uncontroversial is more likely to be found and agreed on; (3) general 
political rights are unaffected; (4) not granting lifetime licenses it is more likely to 
screen out people lacking relevant knowledge, and there is no risk of outdated 
information. As compared to face-to-face deliberative workshops, (1) this process 
significantly lowers costs and barriers for large-scale participation; (2) it allows for 
longer spans of time being allocated to constructing one’s informed participation; (3) 
it allows for easy handling of situations in which participants do not have the relevant 





In the context of deliberative processes that aim to be as inclusive, democratic, and 
participatory as possible, especially when the issues discussed are bioethical, there is 
a need to make sure that ignorant and unreasonable participants are prevented from 
disrupting the deliberation. But, given the value and importance of participation, this 
idea needs to be applied very carefully, and in some contexts it may not be applicable 
at all. We argued that it is possible to apply soft epistocratic constraints on 
deliberative forums limited in scope, such as issue-specific online bioethical forums, 
and that this can be done in a way that is consistent with the tenets of deliberative 
democracy. In fact, we believe, procedures like those we have outlined are an 
extremely useful tool capable of allowing for both the maximization of civic 
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engagement and the moral legitimacy of the output of the deliberative process. 
Competent citizens would be empowered to influence the process itself in a way that 
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